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The purpose of this study was to assess the opinions,

beliefs, and perspectives of former air traffic controllers
who were terminated from employment with the Federal
Aviation Administration for participating in the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO)
strike of 1981.

The study examines the perceptions of the

former controllers to determine their feelings toward the
justification for going on strike over 13 years ago.

This

is relevant in light of recent events including the lifting
of the ban against rehiring PATCO controllers by the
Clinton Administration.
The data collected for this study were obtained with an
opinionnaire mailed via a newsletter to former controllers
who were members of the PATCO union.

It was expected that a

majority of the controllers would feel their actions of 1981
were justified.

This feeling, however, would be mitigated

by the fact that the controllers were terminated for their
actions and sacrificed their careers with the decision
to strike.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 1981, a strike was called by the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) in
an effort to seek concessions from the United States
government.

The strike resulted in the termination of nearly

12,000 air traffic control specialists and the
decertification of the PATCO union.
Thirteen years have passed since the strike but
questions still persist from the users of air traffic control
services regarding the level to which the nation's air
traffic control system has recovered.

These questions are

relevant in light of the fact that a new union, the National
Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), has been formed.
This retrospective analysis of controller's perceptions and
opinions regarding the 1981 strike provides insight into the
psychology of professionals willing to sacrifice their
careers for a cause.

Additionally, analysis of the data

harvested in this study provides information which could be
applied to future labor relations in negotiations where the
prevention of a similar strike is of great social importance.
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Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study is to examine, through an
opinionnaire, the feelings of air traffic controllers who
were terminated for their involvement in the PATCO strike of
August 3, 1981. An evaluation of the fired controller's
opinions will determine whether the strike was justified and
worth the loss of their chosen careers.
Review of Related Literature
This study examines the perceptions of Air Traffic
Controllers who were fired from their chosen profession for
acting on the belief that, by uniting together in the
withdrawal of their services from their employer, they could
effect change.

The controllers, like millions of other

American workers, were members of a labor union.

A labor

union is described as "an association of workers to promote
and protect the welfare, interests, and rights of its
members, primarily by collective bargaining" (Websters, 1988,
p. 1327).
To provide a background to the study, a brief review of
the origins of organized labor in general and of the PATCO
union in particular will be presented.

Following this

review, the circumstances and the atmosphere in which the
PATCO strike of 1981 took place will be introduced.

This

approach is designed to illustrate the strike not as an
arbitrary incident, but rather a culmination of events that
arguably may have been patterned by union history.
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Origins of organized labor in the United States.
The organization of labor in the United States began
approximately two hundred years ago in the late 1700s. Then,
as now, differences existed between employees and employers
regarding work hours, wages, and complaints pertinent to
particular vocations.

The withdrawal of services from an

employer by employees (striking) dates back to the late 1700s
as well, as evidenced by the New York City Printers strike in
1794, the Cabinet Makers strike in 1796, the Federal Society
of Journeymen Cordwainers (shoemakers) of Philadelphia, and
the Pittsburgh Shoemakers who struck in 1809 (Mills, 1989).
In 1871, the Knights of Labor (KOL) emerged as a
dominant force for labor.

The KOL was notable as being among

the first unions to exploit the effectiveness of political
allies and was able to exert strong political influence
during its relatively short twenty-two year lifespan.

The

KOL served as an example of how there can be strength in
numbers, and demonstrated the importance of political support
in achieving goals.

The end of the KOL came about in 1893

due to a bombing during a radical rally which resulted in the
deaths of seven police officers (Mills, 1989).

Such acts of

violence were commonplace during this period and were an
unfortunate by-product of the growth of labor.
Following the KOL, the American Federation of Labor
(AFL) was established and it enjoyed much success in its
organizing efforts through the years of World War I (WWI) and
into 1920.

The 1920s, however, were much less successful
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years for unions in existence at that time.

Early in the

decade there was a severe recession which weakened the unions
to a nearly ineffective state.

As the economy rebounded and

eventually made a strong comeback, the unionization effort
was not able to keep pace.

A causal factor for the slow

growth in union membership during this period was the onset
of mass production processes that used unskilled labor.

This

class of employees, unlike the skilled tradespeople, was not
initially sought for membership as the unionization effort
got underway.
Another component of labor's growth was the introduction
of the Committee on Industrial Organization (CIO) in the
1930s.

The CIO, with unexpected ease, was able to grasp

representation rights for the Unites States Steel
Corporation.

Historically significant, this gain acted as a

catalyst to many other organizing victories, including one
with the Ford Motor Company.

The CIO was bitterly opposed by

the Ford Company in its organizing bid of Ford, and was also
contested by the AFL in this effort.

Its success, however,

firmly entrenched the CIO in the American labor mainstream.
By 1941, the CIO had organized the steel, auto, rubber,
and meat packing industries on a virtually exclusive
basis and was challenging the AFL in many other
industries.

In the process the CIO had broken

completely with the AFL.

In May 1938, the AFL expelled

the CIO unions from membership, and they established a
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rival federation, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (also CIO), ... (Mills, 1989, p. 44).
It was clear at this point in the development of organized
labor that not only were there rifts between employees and
employers, but there were organizing rivalries among the
major representative organizations as well.

Both the AFL and

the CIO were able to increase their numbers considerably
during the years of World War II (WWII), but by 1943 the AFL
had taken a substantial lead as shown in Table 1:
Table 1
Trade Union Membership (in thousands)
AFL
1934

3045

1938

3623

1941
1943
Note.

CIO

Independent

Total

683

3728

4038

604

8265

4569

5000

920

10,489

6564

5285

1793

13,642

From US Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

Handbook of Labor Statistics (Washington, D.C.: US Govt.
Printing Office, December 1980), Bulletin no. 2070, p. 411.
The AFL and the CIO were rival unions with different
ideals.

However, in 1952 the presidents of both unions

passed away and were replaced by George Meany for the AFL and
Walter P. Reuther for the CIO.

Discussions had been taking

place regarding a merger of the two unions, and now that
there was a new leadership core, there remained little of the
animosities and differences that had divided the two.

The
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AFL and the CIO merged in 1955 and became the huge private
sector entity that people are familiar with today, the AFLCIO.

The AFL-CIO showed moderate growth through the 1960s

but never again reached the levels witnessed in the 1930s and
1940s.

In fact, the 1970s brought about a transition whereby

the most growth was in the public sector which includes
state, local and federal employees.
Origins of PATCO.
Among those public employees to become unionized in the
1960s and 1970s were the nations1 air traffic controllers,
who organized in 1968.

The move to unionize followed years

of controller complaints regarding staffing and equipment
that had not received adequate administrative support.
The origins of today's air traffic control system date
back to the early 1930s. Airlines at that time were
concerned with the possibility that the growing number of
aircraft filling the skies could become hazardous, and formed
collaborations to share information regarding the positions
of their aircraft.

The involvement of the government began

in 1934 when it implemented directional altitude separation
standards.

In 1936, a number of airlines further agreed to

begin operating three experimental airway traffic control
stations located in Newark, Chicago and Cleveland.

Later

that year the government became more deeply involved in air
traffic when the Bureau of Air Commerce acquired the stations
and forged the beginning of the federally managed air traffic
control system.
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The system developed slowly, with no major attempts at
expansion until late in the 1940s when WWII came to an end.
At that time there was a multitude of trained airmen
returning to the country looking for employment flying for
the airlines.

The Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) then

opened up funding for additional airway facilities and
staffing, allowing air traffic growth and beginning the
modern age of air travel and air traffic control (Shostak &
Skocik, 1986) .
The 1950s was an era of heavy airline growth that began
to tax the budding air traffic system's capacityControllers were using equipment which was WWII vintage,
taken from Air Force facilities and aircraft carriers.
Controller complaints of the inadequacies of the equipment
went essentially unanswered until 1956 when, in the course of
two weeks, two avoidable air crashes claimed the lives of 202
people (Shostak & Skocik, 1986).

The public was unaccustomed

to hearing of such disasters, especially in an expanding new
industry like aviation.

In 1958 the Federal Aviation Agency

(FAA) was created, assuming the responsibilities held by the
CAA.

At this point there were nearly 13,000 controllers in

the workplace.

While some improvements were made, system

failures remained evident.

Attention was focused on the FAA

in 1963 when a major midair collision occurred, publicly
exposing some of the failings of the FAA.

According to

Shostak & Skocik (1986), what came to light was a controller
workforce that in 1963 was very disillusioned.

There had
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been no new hires added to the system since 1961 and
controllers were being forced, under the threat of dismissal,
to work eight to ten hour days, six days a week.

Additional

problems affecting the controllers were the lack of any
notice being given when enforcing the overtime mandate, the
use of much of the same "archaic" equipment, and the tendency
to attach blame for an aviation accident or incident to the
controller rather than to admit to a problem that may
discredit the system.

These growing signs of antagonism were

beginning to manifest themselves in an adversarial
relationship between the controllers and the FAA management.
In 1962 President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988
permitting unions to organize in the public sector and
obliging federal agencies to negotiate with these unions in a
responsible manner.

A stipulation of this order was that the

unions involved in public sector negotiations could not
bargain over wages, hours, insurance, retirement, or other
like matters that fell under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission, requiring Congressional action in order
to be changed.

The National Association of Government

Employees (NAGE) was one of the first federal employee
associations organized, and they extended invitations to
various air traffic facility locals to join.

Many locals did

join, but by doing so they handicapped themselves by being
independent of other facilities, and due to their isolation
were unable to effect substantive gains.
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In 1967, controllers at the Chicago OfHare facility had
become disgruntled over the staffing and mandatory overtime
issues.

When agreements reached on a regional level were

denied by the FAA, the OfHare controllers enacted a "rule
book" job action (A "rule book" job action means that a
controller, in performing his/her duties, would control
traffic precisely by FAA procedures.

The many methods

commonly used by controllers to expedite the flow of air
traffic are not employed.).

Because O'Hare is one of the

busiest traffic centers in the country, the job action taken
there had a tremendous affect and snarled air traffic
throughout the country.

The FAA acquiesced and almost

immediately agreed to annual increases of $1,100 per
controller, attributing the increase only to the cost of
living in the area, and vowed that like increases would not
be made elsewhere (Shostak & Skocik, 1986).

Other heavy

volume facilities soon followed suit in asking for increases
and in some cases, like Los Angeles, were successful.

These

successes were small and local in nature, and the realization
that a consolidated approach to representation would be
required began to receive support.
A group of controllers from a newly formed organization,
the Metropolitan Controllers Association (MCA) representing
controllers from Atlanta, Chicago, New York, Newark and
Philadelphia, determined that in order to begin an
association with national potential, there would have to be a
key person to serve as a catalyst in getting the organization
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off the ground.

The person chosen to fill this role and lead

the newly formed organization was F. Lee Bailey, a renowned
attorney with a proven history of accomplishments.

Mr.

Bailey was approached on January 4, 1968, with the
controllers proposal.

He accepted, with the fee for his

services set at $100.00, plus expenses, for a period of six
months (Shostak & Skocik, 1986).
The first organizational meeting called by Bailey was
expected to draw approximately 100 controllers.

Instead, a

crowd of more than 600 controllers plus 100 of their spouses
from 22 states showed up.

They listened to Bailey in a two

hour speech termed as "spellbinding" that was recorded and
made available for playback to controllers in all 50 states.
Within one month the new organization had enlisted over 4,000
controllers and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization was born (Shostak & Skocik, 1986).
Events culminating in the 1981 PATCO strike.
The name PATCO was purposely chosen to depict a
professional association rather than a labor union (Shostak &
Skocik, 1986).

The first year of PATCO saw the adoption of

its constitution and its first attempt at reaching a
collective bargaining agreement with the FAA.

F. Lee Bailey

made an agreement that addressed controller concerns over
wage reclassification, reopening of the air traffic
controller training academy, and controller exemption from
civil service regulations as they applied to other public
workers because of the unique nature of the air traffic
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control profession.

This hand-shake agreement, according to

Shostak & Skocik (1986) was between honorable gentlemen that,
despite the urging of other members of PATCOfs leadership,
was not put into writing.

Subsequently, the agreement was

not honored by the FAA and because of this perceived failure,
Bailey's reputation among the controllers was tarnished.
Meanwhile, as PATCO struggled to become a viable
representative for the controllers, a task force had been
commissioned during 1968 to look into air traffic controller
grievances.

The findings of the task force were released in

1970 and supported the controller's claims that their
profession required more of them than those of most federal
employees.

Reforms recommended to the FAA included a sharp

reduction in work hours, the upgrading of equipment and
facilities, the reduction of required overtime, the expansion
of intervals between shift rotations, the revision of pay
criteria, and that negotiations should take place (Shostak &
Skocik, 1986).
PATCO faced a severe challenge to its existence in 1970
when the FAA chose to relocate four active PATCO members from
their Baton Rouge facility against their will.

PATCO1s

threatened sickout to protest the forced moves resulted in
another negotiating session involving F. Lee Bailey and FAA
management.

Bailey worked out an agreement that other PATCO

leaders, remembering the first failed attempt, demanded its
negotiated terms be committed to writing.

Bailey, convinced

he had received appropriate assurances, did not heed the
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demand and settled for a gentlemen's agreement for the second
time (Shostak & Skocik, 1986).

Once again, the FAA did not

honor the terms agreed to with the controllers, this time
resulting in a sickout that had nearly 3,000 participants.
This action brought a severe response by the FAA, including
the withholding of pay from controllers who called in sick
and the issuing of subpoenas to each participating member.
PATCO countered by enlisting the services of 50 attorneys to
represent the controllers.

The move to secure legal

representation resulted in the nearly instantaneous
bankruptcy of the union.

Also, happening concurrently, was

the filing of a lawsuit by the Air Transport Association
(ATA) seeking $100 million because of losses it was suffering
due to the decrease in air traffic services.

Faced with

overwhelming opposition and threats of his personal
disbarment, F. Lee Bailey went on television, and under
duress, called off the sickout (Shostak & Skocik, 1986).

A

federal judge involved with the case ruled that if PATCO ever
"struck" again, it would be subject to fines of $25,000 or
more to be paid to the ATA.

The 'or more' portion of the

previous sentence was to play an important role in the
ultimate undoing of PATCO when the strike of 1981 happened
and the government attached the contingency fund of nearly
$3.5 million held by the union.
Differences between PATCO and the FAA continued through
the 1970s while PATCO was under the leadership of John
Leyden.

The decade was one of controversy for PATCO,
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beginning with the resignation of F. Lee Bailey and ending
with the replacement of Leyden in 1980.

The departures of

each of these leaders were emotionally charged and signaled
directional changes for PATCO.

Bailey resigned in June of

1970, shortly after Leyden was chosen to lead the
controllers.

His leaving marked the end of the involvement

of "non-controllers" in the determination of PATCO's future.
The direction PATCO took in 1970 was toward that of a labor
union rather than strictly that of a professional
association.

Through an affiliation with the Marine

Engineer's Beneficial Association (MEBA), PATCO gained the
alliance of a politically powerful association of
professional workers as well as recognition as a labor union.
With the MEBA affiliation, PATCO also acquired the insight
and advise of Jesse Calhoun, the well respected leader of
MEBA.

PATCO, with assistance from MEBA, was soon able to

become politically active and began its lobbying efforts with
the endorsement of Richard Nixon for President in 1972.
Nixon was successful in his bid for office and, in 1973,
PATCO entered its first contractual negotiations with the FAA
with the hopes of having a friend in the White House.

With a

membership of approximately 8,500 controllers, PATCO was only
mildly optimistic as negotiations began.

Optimism turned to

elation when the union completed its first contract agreement
and came away with what was felt to be a "first-ever contract
more generous than the union had dared hope" (Shostak &
Skocik, 1986, p. 63). As Leyden presided through the second
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contract and into the third, it was beginning to become
apparent that the "no-strike" clause which ultimately
governed the response of government employees was adversely
affecting the union's ability to negotiate.

"By-the-book

slowdowns" and controller "sick-outs" were the typical
weapons employed when negotiating impasses were encountered.
Occasionally, concessions sought by the union did not benefit
all members within the union, and the effectiveness of these
tactics was compromised when membership support was not
sufficiently responsive.
Included in the third contract was an expansion of
Familiarization (FAM) privileges to international flights
(FAM is the term used referring to the ability of a
controller to fly in air carrier cockpits as an observer for
the purpose of becoming better acquainted with pilot
responsibilities.).

This benefit was viewed by some air

carriers as merely a perk and a number of them refused to
honor the FAM flight requests.

Seeing the FAM flights as the

only gain of substance in 1978, Leyden tried to fight the
denial of these flights by threatening an air traffic
slowdown.

Many of the controllers, however, did not see the

FAM flights as a benefit worth initiating a job action for.
Leyden continued his opposition to the cutting out of the FAM
flights on the basis of the effect that conceding an already
negotiated item would have on future contract negotiations.
Leyden called for and got a slowdown to protest the reduction
but the slowdown was not well supported and proved to be
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ineffective.

This issue, together with other problems facing

PATCO such as wage classifications, controller stress rulings
by the FAA, a second career training program, and in-house
controller discontent, served to weaken Leyden's position as
the union's leader.

According to Shostak & Skocik (1986),

the executive board of PATCO began to doubt whether Leyden's
continued role as the leader of PATCO was in PATCO's best
interest.

The internal dissension continued through 1978 and

1979 and into the election period of 1980 when Leyden was
opposed by his Executive Vice President, Robert E. Poli.

At

a controversial meeting in January of 1980, both Poli and
Leyden offered their resignations to the board.

The board

took a vote and in a 6 to 1 decision agreed to accept the
resignation of Leyden and to ask Poli to remain as the new
union president.
Poli's presidency was to last only two years, but those
two years were steeped in a new resolve and commitment to
unity by the controller workforce.

PATCO began to move more

blatantly towards a showdown with the FAA.

Rhetoric from

both sides intensified while contract talks faltered.

In

October of 1980, Poli announced that PATCO would support
Ronald Reagan for President.

In return, Poli received a

letter from Reagan which reads as follows:
Dear Mr. Poli,
I have been thoroughly briefed by members of my
staff as to the deplorable state of our nation's air
traffic control system.

They have told me that too few
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people working unreasonable hours with obsolete
equipment has placed the nation's air travelers in
unwarranted danger.

In an area so clearly related to

public safety, the Carter Administration has failed to
act reasonably.
You can rest assured that if I am elected
President, I will take whatever steps are necessary to
provide our air traffic controllers with the most
modern equipment available, and to adjust staff levels
and workdays so they are commensurate with achieving
the maximum degree of public safety.
As in all areas of the federal government where
the President has the power of appointment, I fully
intend to appoint highly qualified individuals who can
work harmoniously with Congress and the employees of
government agencies they oversee.
I pledge to you that my administration will work
very closely with you to bring about a spirit of
cooperation between the President and the air traffic
controllers.

Such harmony can and must exist if we are

to restore the people's confidence in the government.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
(Personal Correspondence, 1979)
This letter served to bolster the confidence of the
controllers and their leadership in the belief that their's
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was a reasonable position that would have support from the
highest level of government if Reagan were President.
Poli had a list of 96 demands that were brought to the
bargaining table.

Of those, there were three that, according

to Shostak & Skocik (1986) were revealed by controller
questionnaires to be of the most concern.

The other demands

served to emphasize that there was much that would still need
to be addressed.

The three most significant concerns were

those of salary gains, reduced work hours, and retirement
aid.

While progress was made on a number of issues,

negotiating impasses remained.

After many months of talks

without an agreement and an already expired contract, the FAA
was given notice by Poli that PATCO intended to begin a work
stoppage on August 3, 1981, if a settlement could not be
reached.

Unfortunately, the talks did not produce an

agreement between the parties and at 7:00 am on August 3,
1981, nearly 13,000 controllers walked away from their
positions, beginning an illegal strike.
Many controllers felt that President Reagan would
intervene in a way that would, because of his pledge, settle
the dispute in an amiable way.

Instead, Reagan issued an

ultimatum to the controllers that if they did not return to
their positions within a 48 hour period, they would be
terminated.

The controllers held steadfastly to their picket

lines, and subsequently, the vast majority of the nation's
controller workforce was fired.

The strike also resulted in

the bankruptcy of the union, the banning for life of its
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members from working for the FAA as Air Traffic Controllers,
and the ultimate destruction of the union through
decertification efforts initiated by the government.
Post Strikp.
In 1989, approximately 5,000 working controllers
responded to a questionnaire, with a majority of respondents
stating that although the system remains safe, staffing is
less than normal while the workload is often too heavy (Mead,
1989).

The goal for controller staffing has been set at

18,300 (Anderson, 1991).

Thanepohn (1991) has determined the

1991 staffing level of air traffic controllers stood at
17,284, of which 10,776 were considered full performance
level (FPL), meaning they are certified to work at any
position within a facility.

These figures compare to 16,200

controllers in 1981, and of that number, 13,205 were FPL
controllers.

These numbers represent a shortfall of nearly

2,500 FPL controllers although the total number of
controllers is more than 1,000 greater than in 1981.
Staffing figures for the controller work force are also
affected by problems in the way the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) determines who controllers are, "These
problems stem primarily from including persons who do not
control air traffic in the controller work force and
excluding others who do" (Peach, 1987, p. 1).
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) has shown concern
that the level of FPL controllers is inadequate, given a 30%
rise in air traffic volume over the past ten years.

ALPA's
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position had been one of reluctance to see fired controllers
return to work.

Now, ALPA cites that the 500-700 PATCO

controllers who had returned to work through arbitration took
no more than one year to reach the FPL level. ALPA also
feels that enough of a penalty has been paid by fired
controllers and they should be allowed the opportunity to
reapply for their positions (Essler, 1991).

In 1986,

opinions were sought from working controllers and fired
controllers regarding the rehiring issue.

At that time, 57%

of controllers working at the time of the strike and 69% of
those hired since the strike opposed rehiring fired
controllers, while 90% of the fired controllers responded
that they would return to their positions if allowed
(Mclure, 1986).
Since that time, many of the working controller's
opinions have changed to such a degree that NATCA called for
the lifting of the ban on fired controllers at a convention
in 1990 in a resolution directed to President Bush (Anderson,
1990).

NATCA had recently gone through its second election

wherein Steve Bell was replaced by Barry Krasner as
president, and Ray Spickler was replaced by Joe Bellino as
vice president.

This new leadership took its election as a

mandate from the rank and file members to become more
aggressive in their dealings with the Federal Aviation
Administration (Ott, 1991).

A prelude to this renewed

increase in activism was the 1990 protest at the Washington
Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) where picketing took
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place to protest the lack of improvement since the strike,
especially in the area of FPL controller staffing (Thanepohn,
1991).

Another example of controller dissatisfaction in

working conditions was displayed when viewpoints were
solicited from center controllers in the Chicago area (Mead,
1989a).

Additionally, a follow up to a 1985 survey was taken

in 1988 to gauge changes in attitudes, "The 1988 perceptions
of controllers, supervisors, and managers show little change
since our 1985 survey.

Whatever changes the FAA has made

over the years, little overall movement in work force
attitude has occurred." (Mead,

1989b, p. 9).

The concerns of safety advocates such as the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) match those of NATCA,
ALPA, and the FAA in what has been more than 13 years of
debate regarding the safety, efficiency, and competence of
the air traffic system.

Training, automation, and equipment

maintenance are among concerns affecting the controller's
ability to perform.

Training is costly and time consuming,

with the screening phase at the Oklahoma training facility
producing up to a 50% dropout rate.

Steps are being

implemented to shorten the selection time to five days or
less in an effort to save time and money (Mead, 1990).
Simulator training is being considered as a way to save money
and relieve controllers from on-the-job training (OJT)
responsibilities of new-hires (Carrigan, Eggenberger, &
Gerstenfeld, 1992).

Automation has encountered numerous

delays in reaching its potential for controllers.

Systems
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proposed to be on-line in the late 1980s have yet to be
installed, and according to Carlone (1990), the FAA may not
have the required resources in terms of hardware and software
in time to meet the increased demand on air traffic
capabilities for the 1990s.

Equipment maintenance problems

account for 2% of the delays in the air traffic system.
These problems were expected to be reduced with the advent of
new equipment, however, equipment arrival delays have forced
the FAA to re-think its position on maintenance staffing.
The FAA had been relying on less demand for maintenance
personnel by using highly efficient equipment in a plan to
reduce the maintenance work force through attrition.

Because

the equipment has not been available, however, the FAA has
found that there is now a shortage of these personnel.

In

order to keep pace with the demand on the system, the FAA is
using increased overtime, incentives, and contractor services
to help bolster the work force (Peach, 1991).
Summary of Literature Review.
The voices of those most affected by the strike, the
fired controllers, have been relatively quiet during this 13
year period.

Given the condition of today's air traffic

system and the fact that President Clinton lifted the ban on
rehiring fired controllers, it is timely to examine the
general perceptions of the terminated controllers regarding
the actions they took at the time of the strike to determine
if they see similar problems in today's air traffic control
system.

Bill Taylor, of "PATCO Lives", a support group and
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publication for fired controllers, referring to the protest
at the Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC)
stated, "I felt compassion for them, because the system has
come full circle.

I thought of the irony of it and how well

it proves that the issues of the strike have never been
resolved" (Thanepohn, 1991, p. 23).
Statement of the Hypothesis
It is hypothesized that the beliefs, opinions, and
perceptions of former PATCO members will suggest many of the
key issues that led to the strike in 1981 are still
unresolved and are, therefore, potential threats to the
quality, safety, and efficiency of the current air traffic
control system.

Further, because of these beliefs and

perceptions, the fired controllers will feel continued
justification in their actions of 1981 although mitigated by
the loss of their chosen career.

CHAPTER 2
Method
Subjects
The subjects for this study were derived from a
population consisting of approximately 12,000 air traffic
controllers who were terminated from their jobs for
participating in a strike on August 3, 1981.

The sample is

comprised of former air traffic specialists who are members
of PATCO Lives.

PATCO Lives is an advocacy organization

formed by fired controllers and their supporters shortly
after the decertification and bankruptcy of the PATCO union.
PATCO Lives is the only remaining cohesive link to the fired
controller workforce and uses recorded phone messages and a
newsletter to communicate with its nearly 3,000 members.

The

sample includes 380 respondents and represents a diverse
segment of the total population of fired PATCO air
traffic controllers.
Instrument
The instrument for this study is a questionnaire
designed by the researcher to gauge respondent's opinions in
a quantitative manner while allowing commentary input for
supplemental analysis.

This instrument, containing two

parts, is designed to sample only air traffic controllers who
23
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were terminated from employment with the Federal Aviation
Administration for participating in an illegal strike.

Part

1 is designed to gather demographic data while the second
part provides information

which permits evaluation of

respondent's opinions through a structured question format.
Space for respondent's comments provides for additional
information to be used in analyzing generalizations relevant
to the sample.
The instrument was administered through the use of a
mailing to the subjects.

Scoring of the data in this study

requires simple statistical processing by percentage value to
apply the data from the sample to the population for
quantitative results.

Interpretation of comments harvested

through this survey was completed by the researcher and
reviewed by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University faculty
familiar with air traffic control and the situation at the
time of the strike.
Design
The research for this study concentrates on the opinions
of a sample of former air traffic controllers taken from a
population of those controllers terminated from their
positions in 1981 for participating in an illegal strike.
The most appropriate way to accomplish this research is the
descriptive method as depicted in the textbook, Educational
Research, by Gay (1992).

Chosen for its emphasis on the

current status of the subjects and the opinionnaire data
collection method, the descriptive method allows for a
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comprehensive compilation and analysis of data which is best
suited to determining a true consensus of controller
opinions.

The historical method described in this textbook,

Educational Research, by Gay (1992), is used to provide an
account of the pre-strike circumstances contributing to the
breakdown of negotiations and the onset of the strike.

Use

of the correlational method, also outlined in the textbook
Educational Research, by Gay (1992), provides the researcher
with data upon which pertinent conclusions regarding fired
controller attitudes may be drawn.
Procedures
To begin this study, the researcher presents a
historical overview of the development of American unionism
followed by the origin and growth of the PATCO union.

The

purpose of this information is to provide the reader with an
understanding of the events leading to this study.

The study

investigates the attitudes of the air traffic controllers who
were terminated for participating in the PATCO strike
of 1981.
The sample is taken from the population of fired air
traffic controllers who are members of, or accessible by,
PATCO Lives.

The sample consists of approximately 10% of the

target population which is an acceptable sample size.

The

sample was obtained through a newsletter mailing provided by
PATCO Lives, a support group for fired controllers, and the
only remaining link to the fired controller population.
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The instrument, designed by the researcher for this
study, consists of an opinionnaire and a statement to
respondents requesting they complete and return the
opinionnaire.

The opinionnaire is in two parts, with five

demographically oriented questions in the first part and nine
structured questions for quantitative analysis in the second
part.

Available commentary space allows increased

qualitative analysis of the data in the second part.

The

opinionnaire provides instructions for completion, assurance
of anonymity, and a request for response within 14 days.
There was no pretest, and because the instrument is unique to
this study, it was not pre-validated.

To ensure content

validity, the researcher solicited a former controller to
review and critique the instrument.

CHAPTER 3
Analysis

Opinionnaire Part 1 - Demographic Analysis
The questions in Part 1 of the opinionnaire (Appendix
J ) , with the exception of question 5, were designed to
present results in an illustrative manner.

This demographic

data provides information which allows the reader to envision
the comprehensive depth of the sample in terms relative to
the responses given to the structured questions in Part 2 of
the opinionnaire.

Review of the demographic and occupational

data in Part 1 also provides the reader, who may or may not
be familiar with the breadth of the PATCO strike, a basis of
understanding regarding the scope of this national strike and
its participants.

The questions in Part 1 deal with the

longevity, facility level, facility type, and facility
location of the respondent at the time of the strike.
Additionally, the respondent's employment status was included
in the responses.
1.

How long were von employed bv the Federal Aviation
Administration as an air traffic control specialist?
Question 1, Part 1, asks how long the respondent was

employed by the FAA.

The results of this question are shown

in graph form in Figure 1,

In analyzing these results, a
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Figure 1. Part 1, Question 1. How long were you employed
by the Federal Aviation Administration as an air traffic
control specialist?
clear majority is evident in the combined time frames of
10 years and 10-15 years.

5-

These two time frames comprise

nearly 70% of the entire sample.

This information is

significant, in that it represents the most experienced
segment of the air traffic control system in 1981. While it
is recognized that individuals progress in training at
varying speeds, the typical advancement of a controller from
a newly hired developmental to a full performance level (FPL)
controller requires approximately three to five years.

The

time to reach FPL is longer in complex facilities consisting
of many positions at which the controller must become
proficient.

The 69.6% of the sample represented by the 5-10

and 10-15 year categories represents a highly experienced
contingent of former controllers.
The former controllers represented by the three
remaining time frames are divided nearly equally above and
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below the majority segments with 14.2% in the 0-5 year
category and 16.2% in the combined 15-20 year and "other"
category.

The "other" category consists of those controllers

who had more than twenty years of service with the FAA.

It

is of interest to note that the respondent with the most
years service had been employed by the FAA for twenty-seven
years as an Air Traffic Controller.
In terms of controller expertise, this question clearly
shows that the vast majority of respondents had five or more
years experience, with only 14.2% having less.

Indeed, 54.3%

of all respondents had ten or more years experience
controlling air traffic.
2.

What level of facility were you assigned to at the time
of the strike?
Question 2, Part 1, asks what level facility the

respondent was assigned to at the time of the strike. Air
traffic facilities are rated according to the density and
complexity of the air traffic handled, on a scale of one to
five.

A level 1 facility, as an example, is typically a non-

radar, VFR (visual flight rules) control tower which is
minimally staffed and has relatively few aircraft operations.
Many of these facilities have, since the strike, been given
by the FAA via contract to private air traffic companies in
an attempt to make better use of the limited supply of
personnel resources.

Those controllers involved were moved

to busier sites to help bolster staffing deficiencies left by
the strike.
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Level 2, 3 and 4 facilities carry increasing degrees of
complexity and traffic density, and include facilities such
as busier towers controlling non-radar approaches, radar
approach control facilities (RAPCONS), and terminal radar
approach control facilities (TRACONS).

A level 5 facility is

responsible for the most complex and heavy air traffic and is
usually reserved for air route traffic control centers
(ARTCC) and TRACONS such as those located at large
metropolitan airports.

The level associated with each

facility is designated by the FAA and is also used as a
criteria which determines the pay levels attainable by
employees, according to government pay grades (i.e., a GS-7
pay grade for a level one facility versus a GS-14 pay grade
for a level 5 facility).
The graph in Figure 2 shows very similar percentage
values associated with the level 3, 4, and 5 facilities,
while the level 1 and 2 facilities are likewise similar,
albeit approximately 10% less than the level 3, 4, and 5.
The result for the level 1 and 2 facilities was expected to
be proportionately lower, as it is, due to the lesser
manpower requirements connected to the facility size.

These

results, together with the results for the level 3, 4, and 5
facilities demonstrate, by their parity, an excellent cross
section of former controllers by facility level is
represented by the sample.

The 15.5% of respondents in the

"other" category are those former controllers who could not
recall at what level their facility was designated.

Of those
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Figure 2. Part 1, Question 2. What level of facility
were you assigned to at the time of the strike?
respondents who could not recall which rating their facility
held, the majority indicated they were assigned to an ARTCC,
or to a facility which was deemed to be among the busiest.
Some were confused as to whether a level 1 or a level 5
facility was rated busiest.

Assumptions were not made on

this point, thus accounting for the 15.5% figure.

It could

be reasonably expected, however, according to the
respondent's comments, that the 15.5% would follow the same
pattern as the 3, 4, and 5 facilities, with a possible slant
toward the facilities rated at level 4 and 5.
3.

What typp of facility were vou assigned to?
Question 3, Part 1, inquired as to the type facility the

respondent was working in prior to the 1981 strike. The
three most common facility types include control towers,
TRACONS, and ARTCCS (referred to as centers).

While 97.1% of
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OTHER
TOWER

(21.
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\
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Figure 3. Part 1, Question 3.
you assigned to?

What type of facility were

the sample responded within these three categories, there
remained 2.9% who were associated with facility types such as
United States Armed Forces Radar Approach Control Facilities
(RAPCONS), Terminal Radar Approach Control In Tower Cab
(TRACABS), and Combined Center-RAPCON (CERAPS), see Figure 3.
The results of this demographic question serve to
reaffirm the validity of the comprehensive nature of the
sample.

There is a 3.4% difference in the pie graph

segments of Figure 3 representing TRACONS and centers,
proving analogous to the results of Question 2 in Part 1
regarding levels 3, 4, and 5 facilities.

Tower facilities

are represented by 21% of the sample which is comparable to
the Level 1 and 2 facilities of Question 2 in Part 1 of the
opinionnaire, accounting for 19.8% of the sample. Again,
most typical Level 1 and 2 towers are staffed with a minimum
number of controllers, and the disparity between the 21%
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segment shown in Figure 3 and those representing TRACONS and
centers is attributable to this lesser staffing requirement.
4.

In which state was the facility located?
The information obtained from Question 4 of Part 1 of

the opinionnaire lends further credence in assuring the
sample is representative of a comprehensive, yet diverse
cross section of the population of former air traffic
controllers.

As shown by the map depicted in Figure 4, it is

readily apparent that nearly every state in the country is
represented by the sample.
The map in Figure 4 also indicates where concentrations
of former controllers may be found.
in two ways.

These areas are evident

First, it would appear that the larger and more

populous states have the greatest number of respondents.
States like Texas, New York, California, and Florida are
examples of large, heavily populated states.

While this is

true to a certain degree, another factor relative to
concentrated pockets of former controllers would be the
locations of ARTCC facilities.

Included are states like New

Hampshire, Ohio, Colorado, and Minnesota with comparatively
high numbers of respondents.

One may see a correlation

between the two, but not all the states having ARTCCs are
necessarily heavily populated ones.
The demographic information provided by the first four
questions in Part 1 of the opinionnaire is of importance to
the results of this study.

The intent of the study is to

HAWAII
4

Figure 4. Part 1, Question 4.
facility located?

^
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In which state was the

determine a consensus opinion of fired air traffic
controllers.

To do so requires a sample truly representative

of the population of those controllers fired from their
profession.

These demographic questions were designed as a

method of validating that the sample being used is comprised
of respondents whose responses would not be skewed by the
parameters of longevity, facility level, facility type, or
geographic location.
All four questions, when taken individually, instill a
degree of confidence in the validity of the sample.

When

they are considered collectively, however, there is no doubt
that the sample is well rounded and an exemplar of the
population.

Had any of the four questions revealed an

obvious and unqualified disparity in its results, such as all
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responding controllers being from the same geographic region,
or all from the same type facility, the conclusions of this
study may have been compromised by that bias toward only a
very particular portion of the population.

If this were the

case, that circumstance might have rendered continuation of
the study suspect to critical analysis.

The sample does,

however, prove to be valid by the parameters of the questions
in Part 1 of the opinionnaire.

Also, as mentioned earlier,

this information additionally serves to provide the reader
with a basis of understanding regarding the breadth of those
individuals involved in the 1981 strike.
5.

What is your current occupation?
Contributing to the reader's perception of those

controllers involved in the strike are the results taken from
Question 5 of Part 1 which asks the current occupation of the
respondent.

This question is relevant in a number of ways.

For example, the positions held now by the former controllers
may be indicative of the type of positions expected to be
attainable by the FAA controllers currently working who lose
their jobs by medical disqualification or other reasons.

The

positions now being held by former controllers also allow
conclusions to be drawn regarding how the skills of an air
traffic control specialist do, or do not, transfer to the
private sector.
Appendix K lists many of the occupations the former
controllers were involved with at the time the opinionnaire
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was disseminated.

For the purpose of this study, the

occupations were categorized, to the extent possible, to be
compared to those which were solicited in a 1984 study by
Steven O'Keefe.

By approaching the question in this manner,

it is possible to see if there were any progressive or
regressive trends in the employment of the former
controllers.

The eight categories used by O'Keefe and their

corresponding values are shown in Table 2.
The occupations exhibiting the greatest change since the
1984 study are the 11.7% increase in the "Professional"
category and the 9.6% decrease in the "Sales" category.

It

should be noted at this point, that the comparisons and
conclusions regarding the information in Table 2 cannot be
Table 2.
Occupations Held by Former Controllers
Category

1984

1993

Difference

Professional

3%

14.7%

+11.7%

Management

5%

7.9%

+ 2.9%

Sales

18%

8.4%

- 9.6%

White Collar

26%

17.3%

- 8.7%

Self Employed

10%

7.9%

- 2.1%

Blue Collar

22%

27.9%

+ 5.9%

ATC Here and Abroad

11%

7.1%

- 3.9%

6%

7.4%

+ 1.4%

Unemployed
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qualified scientifically in this study due to the fact that
the sample used in the O'Keefe study was not available for
use and is therefore not known to the researcher beyond its
results.

The information is relative, however, and does

indicate that generally the former controllers appear to be
making progress in advancing in their new vocations.

For

example, the percentage of those in sales positions following
the strike may indicate that sales was one of the areas where
jobs were more obtainable at the onset of the strike.

Since

the strike was more than 13 years ago and many controllers
are now involved in

completely new endeavors, the increase

in the "Professional" and "Management" categories would, as
in normal career development, indicate expected advancement
over an extended period of time.
The variance in the White Collar and Blue Collar
categories suggest a generic shift in the workforce prevalent
in recent years where focus has been placed on downsizing,
restructuring, and reductions in the ranks of middle
management.

The decreases in the categories of "Self

Employed" and "ATC Here and Abroad" are small and do not
appear to be significant.

Similarly, the 2.4% increase in

the "Unemployed" category, while not significantly large, may
be due to the economic recession experienced in the past few
years.

Again, while not entirely scientific in nature, this

information is generally acceptable and is presented to
further appraise the reader of characteristics of the sample
prior to the analysis of the questions in Part 2 of
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the opinionnaire.
Opinionnaire Part 2 - Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis
The questions in Part 2 of the opinionnaire, with the
exception of Question 9, were designed in a manner allowing
the respondent to provide concise, quantifiable responses.
In addition, each question offered space for the respondent
to comment on his/her answer.

This feature was the vehicle

that furnished qualifiable information pertaining to the
consensus sentiment of the sample.

Question 9 was not a

quantifiable question, but did solicit a qualifiable answer
regarding concerns the respondents may have in returning to
the ATC profession.
The results of Part 2 of the opinionnaire are presented
in two ways.

The first relates the findings of the

quantifiable portion of the question.

This is accomplished

by percentage values depicted in bar graph form, providing
consistency as well as ease in visual discernment for the
reader.

The second way the results are presented is by

relating a compilation of the qualifiable information taken
from the comment section of the respondent's answers.
Determination of the responses of greatest frequency and
commonality within each question enables a complementary
perspective to be developed.

This perspective is crucial in

ascertaining beliefs truly representative of the sample.
Quoted examples of responses made by the former controllers
for each question are highlighted in Appendices A through I.
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1•

When the strike began, did you feel it was a justifiable
cause?
Based on the fact that this question was asked of people

who went out on strike, remained on strike in the face of a
presidential ultimatum, and were subsequently fired, it was
expected that a majority of respondents would reply in the
affirmative.

While the majority did reply as expected, see

Figure 5, an underlying intent of the question was to gauge
the level of respondents who answered in the negative and
determine the reasons behind their decision to participate in
the strike.

As Figure 5 shows, 87% of respondents answered

YES, 12% answered NO, and less than 1% did not respond.
The 87% that answered YES cited a variety of reasons to
support the position they took.

The issues of equipment,

safety, and staffing were predominant, while secondary
issues such as the feeling that there was no choice but to
strike and union loyalty also impacted the controllers
decisions.

In justifying the "No Choice" response, comments

included fears of the lack of long term survivability
working as an air traffic controller, a belief that there had
been a "set-up" on the part of the FAA to destroy the union,
and the belief that the FAA did not negotiate in good faith,
thereby forcing the strike to happen.

Regarding union

loyalty, it is of interest to note that there were very few
comments from controllers claiming peer pressure as a reason
for participating in the strike.

Others who had answered YES

to this question expressed their feelings that the
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Figure 5. Part 2, Question 1. When the strike began, did
you feel it was a justifiable cause?
methodology chosen by PATCO to fight the FAA by striking was
wrong, as was the time chosen to enact it. Although they
harbored misgivings, these controllers nonetheless went on
strike in support of their union and co-workers.
Of the 12% of the respondents who answered in the
negative, nine stated that they had no reason to go on
strike, believing things were good for them as they were.
Some of these people went out on strike in support of the
union, but expressed reservations or fear of reprisal if they
had not.

The fear refers to the idea that, if the strike had

been successful, the union or individuals within the union
would retaliate against a member who did not support the
strike effort.

It is of importance to realize that, in air

traffic control, controllers are responsible for the on-thejob training of other controllers.

The potential exists for

a controller holding ill will towards another controller to
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seriously impede the training and progressive checkout of
that person through the various positions within a facilityChecking out at all required positions is the way controllers
advance to the full performance level at a given facility.
If a controller is found to be unable to qualify for the
positions at his/her facility, consequences may include
delays in monetary upgrades, reassignment to a lesser
facility, or in worst case scenarios, the potential
for dismissal.
The 12% figure attached to the negative answers
represents the opinions of 46 controllers out of the sample
of 380.

In addition to the reasons mentioned, some fired

controllers stated their discomfort with the legal issue of
striking against the U. S. Government and breaking a personal
oath.

Others felt they had been misinformed and/or misled by

either the FAA or the PATCO union and may have acted
differently if they had been better appraised of all the
circumstances involved.

Another sentiment expressed was for

alternative actions to the strike, similar to the slowdowns
and sickouts PATCO had effectively employed in the past.
There were a multitude of individual feelings, the most
common of which have been discussed above.

A point of

interest worth noting is, when the strike began, much
attention had been given to the union demand of a $10,000
raise.

Of the responses received, there was a negligible

number of respondents who named money as a concern.

The

issues of inadequate equipment and related safety problems
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are indicated by the respondents as having been the paramount
concerns for them in determining their decision to strike was
a justifiable cause.
2.

In retrospect, do you now feel the strike was
justified?

This question serves as the primary focus of this study
in determining the correctness of the hypothesis.

The

hypothesis states that there would be a continued feeling of
justification on the part of the fired controllers for their
actions in 1981, however, their perceptions of justification
would be mitigated by the losses they suffered.

Figure 6

clearly indicates, after more than 13 years, the fired
controllers maintain a conviction of justification in their
decision to participate in the PATCO strike.

The percentage

of controllers who answered in the negative supports, in
part, expectations that their belief the strike was justified
is mitigated by their losses.

The comments made by the

former controllers further enhance the premise of their sense
of loss.
A comparison between Figure 5 and Figure 6 reflects
nearly a 16% increase in those controllers who, in
retrospect, do not feel the PATCO strike was justified.

The

number of respondents who answered NO to this question is
106.

Some of the more common responses of those

controllers included twenty-one who stated that, in
hindsight, they no longer felt their actions were justified,
seven who felt they had been misled into striking, six who
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felt their efforts had been in vain, and five who believed
the financial and emotional costs had been too high.
The respondents who answered YES, in many cases, did so
emphatically using terms such as "absolutely", "100%", and
"Now more than ever!".

Twenty-one indicated they still felt

complete justification in what they did.

Eight respondents

believed there was no choice except to strike, five related
that what they knew to be legally wrong, was the morally
right thing to do, and three others termed the strike a setup.

Again, as in the first question of this part of the

study, there were numerous other responses expressing
personal thoughts and emotions.
One of the more common responses received on both sides
of this question stated the PATCO controllers wish that
things had been done differently, with emphasis on the point
that they should have stayed on the job and attempted to
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change conditions from within.

The responses generally

conveyed a feeling of pride the former controllers had in
their conviction to support what they believed in regardless
of the subsequent personal losses experienced.

The losses

extend beyond the obvious loss of a career to include long
term friendships with controllers who opted not to strike,
deaths of fellow strikers by suicide, the loss of family
because of divorces induced by strike related stress, and job
skills which have few private sector applications.

These

examples and others the respondents express throughout Part 2
of the opinionnaire are representative of some of the burdens
the fired controllers feel they have been forced to bear
since the onset of the strike.
3.

Do you feel the government had any viable alternative to
terminating you after the 48 hour return to work
ultimatum was issued?
The responses received for this question indicate an

indomitable belief on the part of the fired controllers that
the strike could have been averted had alternative
opportunities been pursued by the government.

As the graph

in Figure 7 illustrates, 85.5% of the PATCO controllers felt
the government had choices available short of terminating
their employment.

The response most frequently cited

communicated the idea that the fired controllers believed the
government should have negotiated in good faith.

This

particular response represented the opinions of 17.9% of the
respondents.

This response, when considered conversely,
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implies the former controllers feel the government failed to
negotiate in good faith throughout the talks leading to
the strike.
Of the other responses pertaining to the YES side of
this question, two had relatively high frequencies.

The

first being that both sides should have submitted to binding
arbitration to settle the unresolved issues.

These

respondents felt that a mediator, holding no bias towards
either side, would have presented the best opportunity for a
resolution acceptable to both parties.

The second response

advocated a cooling off period to allow the tension of the
strike to subside and cooler heads to prevail.
Another commonly echoed sentiment was that the 4 8 hour
ultimatum issued by President Reagan was inappropriate given
the gravity of the situation the strike presented, and the
consequences that eventually came from it.

Additional

alternatives recommended by the respondents included the
possibilities of suspensions without pay and/or the levying
of fines.
The PATCO controllers also believe they were wrongly
denied the opportunity to reapply for their positions after a
three year penalty, prescribed by law, had expired.

They

felt the refusal to accept applications after the three
years had passed added a vindictive quality to the ultimatum
which stated the controllers would never be allowed to work
for the FAA as controller specialists again.

Typically, a
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Figure 7 _ Part 2, Question 3. Do you feel the government
had any viable alternative to terminating you after the 48
hour return to work ultimatum was issued?
person terminated from a governmental position has the right
to be reconsidered for that position after a three year
period has passed, but President Reagan chose at the time to
disqualify the controllers from working air traffic control
for the FAA for life.

There is, concurrent with the

compilation of this study, a court case addressing the issue
of the three year rule.
rea pply

Fired controllers who attempted to

after the three year period ended in 1984, together

with the others who did not, are represented in this case.
On the other side of this question, 13.7% of the
responding controllers answered NO.

The most popular reason

given for the NO response was the thought that President
Reagan had painted himself into a corner by issuing the 48
hour ultimatum as he did in a Rose Garden news conference.
These respondents feel the President had left himself without
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a face-saving way out of the situation once the time limit
had been set and with no option other than to carry out the
threat he made.

Some of the respondents also felt another

consideration was that the President had no choice but to
fire the controllers due to pending negotiations with postal
workers and the potential for a labor action by that group.
As the PATCO job action was the President's first serious
confrontation with a federal labor organization since his
inauguration, a determined show of strength on the part of
the government was perceived as necessary.

Indications were,

that if control of the broader picture of labor in general
was to be maintained, the controllers would have to be made
examples of.
4.

Do you feel the ATC system has recovered to an
acceptable level of safety and efficiency?
When Question 4 was developed, it was intended to be a

cut-and-dry YES or NO question.

Analysis of the data

received, however, indicated that a number of respondents
felt the question considered two separate concerns, safety
and efficiency.- rather than as a combination.

To express

their opinions, some respondents either checked both the YES
and NO boxes, or did not check any box.

For the purpose of

accommodating these opinions, the responses were classified
together with those of the No Answer category.

Figure 8

shows those who responded with both answers or no answer
represents 10.5% of the sample, or 40 respondents.

There

were 14 responses indicating that in terms of safety, the
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system has recovered, while in terms of efficiency it has
not.

Others who did not answer the question commented they

were now too far removed from the industry to render a
knowledgeable response.
Figure 8 indicates 70.8% of the sample believes the ATC
system has not recovered from the effects of the PATCO
strike.

Supporting the negative response, there were three

responses which were common.

The most popular of the three

was partially dependent upon second hand knowledge, meaning
that according to people the respondents know who are
working in the industry, and exposed to the ATC system,
problems prevalent before the strike continue to hinder air
traffic in today's system.
The second most common response concerned the efficiency
level of the current system.

The sample's responses point to

flow control delays and fifteen mile in-trail restrictions
contributing to an inefficient operation.

Flow control

refers to the monitoring of air traffic arriving, departing,
or traversing areas typically burdened with excessive amounts
of air traffic.

Flow control takes into account the amount

of anticipated traffic, weather conditions, runway usage, and
other variables in a decision making process which dictates
to the affected areas how much air traffic is permissible
under the given conditions.

These decisions affect the users

of the system when the level set by flow control does not
meet that requested by the users.

The result is the issuance

of "expect times", or the time when the user can expect to
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Figure 8. Part 2, Question 4. Do you feel the ATC system
has recovered to an acceptable level of safety and
efficiency?
receive a clearance for a flight plan to become active.

The

difference between the user's originally requested time and
that given through flow control constitutes the delay the
user will incur.

Fifteen miles in-trail is the distance one

aircraft must remain behind another to maintain current safe
separation standards.

Some of the subjects stated that in-

trail restrictions relegated the controller to a position of
being an air traffic monitor rather than an air
traffic controller.
The third most common response referred to the number of
full performance level (FPL) controllers now working the
system versus the pre-strike level.

Thirteen respondents

were of the opinion the number of FPLs remains below
acceptable levels to efficiently handle the current volume of
air traffic.
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Referring again to Figure 8, 18.7% of the respondents
believe the air traffic control system has recovered from the
strike.

Many of the respondents answering YES to this

question did so without comment.

Those who did comment

seemed to only grudgingly accept their answer by adding
qualifying remarks such as references to the "Big Sky"
theory, or citing the lack of major crashes involving
controller error as the criteria on which their answer was
based.

The "Big Sky" theory is a common aviation reference

to the idea that there is so much air space available that
the odds of any two aircraft being at the same place at the
same time are very low.

Therefore, the probability of a

collision is relatively low even without the presence of the
air traffic controllers.
Of the 380 respondents included in this study, 12% or 47
of them are currently involved in aviation and have exposure
to the current ATC system.

Eleven respondents are pilots,

three of whom believe the system has recovered while eight do
not.

Other respondents who work in the industry include six

who now work in airport operations, three who are employed as
aeronautical information specialists, and twenty-seven who
are involved in air traffic control.

Those involved in air

traffic control include twelve who control air traffic for
the Department of Defense, three who now control air traffic
in a foreign country, and twelve who are employed by private
air traffic control companies.
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5.

Do you feel the current ATC workforce has benefitted by
your sacrifice, in terms of overall working conditions?
The data received for Question 5 of Part 2 reveals that

the former air traffic controllers are nearly equally divided
in their opinion of whether or not the present controllers
are better off now because of the PATCO strike.

As Figure 9

shows, 46.6% of the respondents believe the present
controllers have benefitted by the PATCO controllers
actions, while 43.1% feel they have not.

Thirty-nine

controllers, or 10.2%, did not answer the question.
The most popular answer of those holding the YES opinion
referred to the increases in pay and benefits the current
controllers have received since 1981. A number of
respondents cited specific salary differences as a reason
for their YES answer.

One such response placed the yearly

salary for a GS-14 step 4 position in 1981 at $42,000, versus
the same position in 1992 receiving $70,000.

The validity of

the comparison was not verified due to the fact that the
comment solicited by the opinionnaire was taken at face
value as being true to the feelings of the individual
respondent.

There were other comparisons as well, but the

point was made that the former controllers feel substantial
monetary gains have been realized by the controllers now
working for the FAA.

Other benefits mentioned include pay

differentials for controllers while they are performing onthe-job training for other controllers.

Also, incentives are

in place for those who work at facilities traditionally
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Figure 9. Part 2, Question 5. Do you feel the current
ATC workforce has benefitted by your sacrifice, in terms
of overall working conditions?
difficult to staff because of the volume and complexity of
the traffic managed at such sites.

Several respondents

summed up their sentiments by lamenting that the current
controllers now have what the PATCO controllers had
asked for.
The former controllers who answered NO to this question
generally felt there had been negligible change during the
past thirteen years.

In particular, they believe the

autocratic management style which pervaded the system in 1981
remains intact and unresponsive.

Fifteen controllers (3.9%)

stated their view that conditions had actually worsened for
the controllers now working.

Supporting the belief

conditions had worsened since 1981, these controllers pointed
to present controllers working more traffic with fewer FPLs
and with an average skill level significantly below that of
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1981.

Others expressed their hopes that the working

conditions in the FAA had improved, but were skeptical that
they had.
6.

If the ban on rehiring was lifted, would you have
reapplied for your position?
Question 6 of Part 2 asked the respondent to answer the

question in each of four time frames.

The time frames

include the periods from 1 month to 3 years, 3 years to 7
years, 7 years to 11 years, and now, (Now refers to the time
the opinionnaire was received by the respondent).

The

purpose of the question was to gauge if, when, and to what
degree, the members of the sample would resign themselves to
the eventual end of their endeavor to regain employment with
the FAA.
Referring to Figure 10, it is evident that when the
strike began, and for the first three years following the
strike, the vast majority (92.1%) of the controllers would
have reapplied for their positions, if allowed.

This three

year period includes the time used to complete the appeal
process attempted by much of the fired controller population,
while hopes remained high for a negotiated settlement.

As

time passed through the second time frame to the seventh year
after the strike, there was nearly a 10% drop in the number
of controllers who would have opted to reapply to work air
traffic.

The largest drop, 14.7%, came between the second

and third time frames which extends to elevten years after
the strike.
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Figure 10. Part 2, Question 6. If the ban on rehiring
was lifted, would you have reapplied for your position?
The reasons given for the decline in the number of
controllers who would reapply to the FAA are many.

There

are, however, three reasons which stand out among the others.
The first is that a lot of time has passed and the
controllers have begun new careers.

These controllers are

satisfied in their new vocations and would not risk their
current positions, or cause renewed family upheaval in an
unguaranteed attempt to become a controller again.

Secondly,

a number of controllers believe their advanced age would
adversely affect their ability to be rehired.

Third, some

controllers expressed reservations regarding the current
status of their health and the prospects of being able to
pass the required physical examination.
Interestingly, the final time frame which asks if the
respondent would reapply now produced an increase from 67.9%
to 74.7%, with 94.7% of the respondents participating in this
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portion of the question.

These figures not only show a

slowing in the rate of decline in interest in reapplying, but
a 6.8% increase in those who would reapply.

It is surmised

that the change in the trend developing in Figure 10 is
attributable solely to the fact that as the opinionnaires
were being disseminated, President Clinton lifted the bannedfor-life penalty imposed upon the controllers in the fall of
1993 and granted them the opportunity to reapply for
employment with the FAA.

The lifting of the ban by President

Clinton has rekindled a spark of hope for those controllers
who still wish to return to the ATC profession.
Proof of the amount of interest created by the action of
President Clinton has been indicated by the thousands of
applications the FAA has received from former PATCO members.
The number of applicants continues to rise, although at the
time of this writing, no fired controllers have been rehired
through this initiative.

Presently, there is a hiring freeze

in effect, but attempts are being made by PATCO Lives and
other groups to secure increased staffing appropriations to
expedite the rehiring of former PATCO members.
An observation regarding the steadfast determination of
the sample respondents was made obvious during the analysis
of the data for this question.

As the tallies were

completed, it was noted that 60.3% of the controllers had
indicated they would have reapplied for their former
positions for all the time frames since the strike began.

It

has been more than 13 years since the controllers lost their
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jobs, but the desire to do what they feel they do the best
remains a passionate goal.

Contrasting this 60.3% figure

with the 1.5% who responded that they would not have
reapplied with the FAA at any time since the strike, one can
sense how deep the sentiments of these controllers run. An
example of the depth of feeling retained by some of the
controllers is evidenced by the statements of two
controllers.

One stated, "I loved the profession and gave my

life to it".

The other said, "I miss my profession...ATC is

what I am".

As is the case with the other questions in Part

2 of the opinionnaire, a compilation of quoted responses for
both sides of the questions is included in Appendix F.
7.

Do you feel animosity would be an issue if PATCO
controllers returned to the ATC system?
The issue of animosity, examined by this question, is

one which must be dealt with by employees who have been
involved in a strike, then returned to work with those who
did not participate in or agree with the job action.
Retribution has historically been a problem in emotionally
charged strikes where some employees support the issues and
others do not.

This is especially the case when those who

did not support the action benefit because of those who did.
If PATCO controllers were reintegrated into the ATC system,
it would be naive to assume there would be no harboring of
animosity.

It is with this thought in mind that Question 7

was asked.

The feelings of the fired air traffic

controllers, 13 years after the event, may reveal whether
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emotions have calmed, or assist in determining to what extent
precautions may be necessary if the controllers return to the
FAA in substantial numbers.
Figure 11 illustrates the results received.

Based

solely on the depiction of the graph in this figure, the
indication would be that the majority of PATCO controllers do
not believe that animosity would be an issue if they were to
return to the FAA.

The comments accompanying the YES/NO

answers, however, tend to moderate this majority to a certain
degree.

For example, a number of the controllers who

answered NO go on to make statements such as, "No, at least
not on my part".

While the quantitative indication is NO, a

fair assumption would suggest that the potential for
animosity related problems exists, albeit not a blatant one.
Nineteen controllers answered in this manner.
Twenty-five controllers responded that there would be
some animosity-

These controllers were inclined to chose the

wording of their responses carefully, alluding that animosity
would be on the part of others and not themselves.

Another

22 respondents said if any ill will were evidenced, it would
come from FAA management, not the returning controllers.

The

inference drawn from the controller's comments is that more
controllers than represented in Figure 11 believe there would
be some amount of animosity, but the controllers would not be
the party responsible for initiating it.
Throughout the 13 years since the strike, the issue of
animosity has been brought up each time the possibility of
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Figure 11. Part 2, Question 7. Do you feel animosity
would be an issue if PATCO controllers returned to the ATC
system?
reinstatement or reapplying was discussed.

The graph in

Figure 11, while indicating 76.5% of the controllers do not
feel there would be an animosity issue, also shows 18.6% who
believe there would be.

The degree to which this percentage

of controllers would be participants in any acts to
demonstrate those feelings cannot be determined.
Furthermore, it should be noted that no response specifically
proposed or advocated any adverse actions, rather there was
the generalized thought that someone other than the
respondent would be the holder of any ill will.
Further analysis of the responses reflect the varied
sentiments held by the controllers.

Twelve felt that too

much time had elapsed for there to be continued sensitivity
in this matter.

Several controllers remarked that they were

professionals, and as such would put personal feelings aside
in the performance of their dutifes.

Others believe there are
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so few people remaining who were working in 1981 that the
question is moot.

The fired controllers do not appear to

hold any feelings of animosity towards the people who have
been hired since the strike, recognizing they were simply
seizing an employment opportunity presented by the FAA.

Only

six PATCO respondents specifically mentioned their disdain
for strike breaking controllers they have labeled as "scabs"
or "sprinters".
Considering the quantitative results together with the
qualifying comments, the consensus opinion of the PATCO
controllers regarding the animosity issue can be summarized
as follows.

The controllers generally feel that animosity

will not prove to be an issue if they are returned to their
former positions.

This is not to say that there will not be

isolated areas where evidence of animosity arises.

There are

still strong feelings among individuals within the sample
such as those who feel they were wronged by the FAA and the
President and have not completely reconciled the losses they
have incurred.

One of the most commonly agreed upon points,

discussed further in Question 9 of Part 2, is the belief the
controllers have that there will be a strong possibility that
animosity and related problems will emanate from the FAA
management ranks toward former PATCO members.

Some of the

expressed fears include, purposeful washouts while the
controllers are retraining, offers of positions in
geographical locations which are located unreasonable
distances from the controller's current home, and abuses
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aimed at continuing to make examples of the PATCO controllers
and their failed actions of 1981.
8

-

If vou were to return to the FAA, do you feel your ATC
skills would be adversely affected by twelve years away
from the position?
The passage of more than 13 years since the demise of

PATCO constitutes a large portion of the careers of the
former controllers who participated in the 1981 strike.
These 13 years have been devoted to the search for, or
working at, alternative vocations to the one they were
trained to perform.

The 13 year period also represents what

would have been prime years for many of the controllers in
terms of their proficiency in applying their ATC skills.
This statement is based on the average amount of time the
sample had been employed by the FAA, as related in Question 1
of Part 1.

Now, because the potential exists for fired

controllers to be rehired, there is cause to consider how
these controllers feel their skills have fared during the
extended time which has lapsed since they last worked an
ATC position.
Results derived from the data received for this question
indicate the sample holds confidence in its ability to
respond to the challenge of once again controlling air
traffic.

This confidence, however, is tempered by the

combined effects of advancing age, changing health, and
prolonged absence from active controller duties.

Indications

that time may have taken a toll on a number of the former
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Figure 12. Part 2, Question 8. If you were to return to
the FAA, do you feel your ATC skills would be adversely
affected by twelve years away from the position?
controllers is evidenced by the 29.4% who responded YES to
this question.
The graph in Figure 12 shows 66%, or 251 of the 380
sample controllers believe their skills at controlling air
traffic have not been adversely affected by the years
spent away from their former positions.

Fifty-one of these

respondents stated the 13 year period has had minimal effect
on their skills and they would need little retraining to
regain their former proficiency level. Another 29
controllers said they felt somewhat "rusty", inferring the
probability their retraining would require additional time.
Ten respondents cited the adage of air traffic control being
likened to riding a bicycle, once you learn, you never
forget.

Additionally, 10 respondents answered with emphatic

NO'S, while 12 others noted they were currently working in an
air traffic controller capacity.

None of the 12 currently

working as ATC's mentioned having experienced difficulties in
their retraining.
The most common response received from the 29.4% (112)
of the respondents who answered YES blamed advanced age, its
accompanying deterioration of physical abilities, and too
much time away from the job for their belief that their
skills have been adversely affected.

Returning to Question 1

of Part 1 which asked how long the respondent had been
employed as a controller, 16.2% or 62 controllers had accrued
15 to 27 years experience at the time of the strike.
Assuming these controllers began their careers at age 20,
they would now be between 4 7 and 5 9 years of age. Advanced
age coupled with declining health make the passing of
stringent annual medical examinations less easy to
accomplish.

While admitting their skills have diminished,

many of these controllers still wish to return to their
profession, believing their experience level to be preferable
to hiring a person with no experience.
In the event a rehiring initiative is enacted, a
possible area of debate may exist for either side of the
rehiring issue regarding a controller's age versus his/her
ability to perform ATC duties. At stake in this debate is
the potential for the denial of consideration to some
controllers due to their age.

Because rehiring procedures

have yet to be determined, the parameter of age may be
restrictive, disqualifying many who feel they can do the job.
One controller's view of this question regarding his ability,

relevant to age, reads as follows.

"No.

That's an ego

answer, my body is 48 but my brain still envisions that body
working 20 airplanes at a time."
9-

What concerns would you have about returning to ATC?
The ban against fired PATCO members working as air

traffic controllers for the FAA was lifted in the fall of
1993 by President Clinton.

This act opened the doors for

those fired controllers who have a continued desire to
control air traffic to reapply for positions within the FAA.
Since the ban was lifted, the FAA has received several
thousand applications from PATCO members, however, none have
been rehired through this initiative as of August, 1994. The
reason given by the government for not increasing staffing
levels with available PATCO controllers is a hiring freeze
within the FAA because of national budgetary constraints.
According to PATCO Lives, there remains resistance at
the FAA to PATCO controllers being rehired.

PATCO Lives and

its network of supporters are continuing efforts to ensure
that when the hiring freeze is ended, the fired controllers
are given equal, if not preferential opportunity
for employment.
The PATCO controllers, generally in their middle aged
years, will have decisions to make should rehiring become a
reality.

Relocation, re-qualifying, leaving current

occupations, and family upheaval are a few of the
considerations they have to take into account when deciding
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to return to work for the FAA.

For this reason, the concerns

the former controllers share in returning to the air traffic
profession are pertinent to this study, especially in light
of the number and experience level of those expressing a
desire to return to work.

These figures are demonstrated by

data discussed earlier in this study.

The information

obtained from this question may be of value to those
establishing rehire parameters, in that creating a desirable
"mix" of returning controllers may be preferable to an ad hoc
approach to placement.
The answers to Question 9 of Part 2 have been grouped by
the frequency of similar comments received.

The comments are

combined into nine groups containing at least 15 similar
responses.

Question 9, unlike the others in Part 2 of the

instrument, was not designed in a YES/NO quantifiable manner
for graphic presentation.

Rather, the alternative method of

grouping by comment commonality was employed to enhance the
analysis of the responses.

Additionally, the reader is given

the benefit of exposure to the shared concerns and
apprehension held by those controllers who may return to work
for the FAA.

In organizing the responses into groups,

accommodation was made for respondents relating more than one
concern.

Therefore, multiple responses may have been

included from individual controllers.
Interestingly, the most common response regarding the
former controllers returning to work was not a concern at
all.

The response, simply stated, was "None".

Seventy-three

(19.2%) of the respondents answered in this way.

From this

comment, it appears these controllers would be receptive to
return to work offers and would be apt to do so without
reservation or condition.
Approaching the most common response in frequency is the
first response group expressing a concern.

This response

targets FAA management as responsible for the concern 65
(17.1%) of the controllers would have in returning to work.
The fear of vendettas and discrimination, together with the
belief that there has been no change within the autocratic
management structure of the FAA fuels the concern generated
by this response.

Mention was made by some controllers that

much of the FAA leadership present at the time of the strike
has likely been reduced through retirement and attrition.
Others who remain, however, have been mentors for the
succeeding generation of supervisory personnel, creating the
belief that a self perpetuating management cycle exists.
The third group consists of 48 (12.63%) controllers
whose concern is the location they will be required to accept
in order to gain employment.

Many expect offers of

reemployment will contain prohibitive, or unacceptable
conditions of relocation.

This example is representative of

the choices PATCO controllers will have to make. An
employment opportunity, contingent upon relocation, forces
priority decisions to be made regarding family upheaval and
displacement.

These 48 controllers fear their opportunity

may be lost because they will not be allowed to return to
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their former facility or a facility near where they currently
reside.

Some submit the FAA may purposefully offer positions

containing unacceptable relocation requirements.

This, they

feel, would present the FAA as benevolent towards the
controllers while the controllers appear unappreciative by
not accepting offered positions.
The fourth group cites fair treatment as a concern.
Questions pertaining to pay. seniority, and training will
affect the decisions of the controllers in this group.

They

fear their pay will not be commensurate with their experience
level, and believe they will be required to accept a position
below that held prior to the strike.

These controllers

wonder whether they will receive credit for their past work
and have their seniority integrated with the currently
working controllers, or be placed below those now working.
Also, as mentioned earlier in this study, controllers train
other controllers via on-the-job training.

The PATCO

controllers exhibit concern that they might not be given a
fair opportunity to retrain by some of the current
controllers who would conduct the training.

Of great concern

in this case would be a controller who was working in 1981
and did not support the strike having the responsibility to
train a PATCO controller.

Here, the aforementioned issue of

animosity has the potential to become a factor in the
training process.

Thirty-four controllers, or 8.94% of the

sample, are included in this group.

67
As indicated earlier, the majority of PATCO controllers
are well into their middle aged years.

Because of their age,

the concern of retirement/age is a particularly critical one.
There were 28 (2.36%) respondents who expressed this concern.
Some because they had very little time left to go before
attaining retirement eligibility.

Other controllers

questioned their ability, because of their age, to do the job
after such an extended absence.
A point which warrants comment on the issues of
retirement and age is the fact that, in the case of new
hires, the FAA maintains a hiring cutoff age of 31.

From the

responses received, there are relatively few controllers
concerned with the hiring cutoff age, apparently assuming
that because they are being considered for rehire, the age
restriction will not apply.

Concern may be warranted,

however, since the rehiring parameters have not been revealed
by the FAA.

For example, should the FAA decide 45 years of

age is the oldest they will consider for rehire, a large
portion of the population would be automatically ineligible.
Forty-five is an arbitrary figure, but the significance of
the point is obvious.

Unless forced to consider all

applicants equally, the FAA will have the freedom to
discriminately choose the controllers it wishes to rehire.
The effort to lift the ban on rehiring PATCO controllers
emphasized the experience of the fired controllers as a means
of restoring capacity to the ATC system.

Determining the

appropriate mix of age and experience against the unknown
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point of diminishing return as it applies to the controllers
abilities will be a formidable task.
The sixth concern, expressed by 24 controllers, was
checkout.

Checkout refers to re-qualifying to the full

performance proficiency level.

While approximating the

fourth concern of fair treatment, the sixth concern is
specific to the retraining/re-qualifying issue.

The fear

involved with this concern is the possible consequence of
being removed from employment once again, this time due to
lack of performance, or a perception thereof.
job training is imperative to this end.

Again, on-the-

Having to depend on

the variable of individual trainers being conducive to the
task of re-qualifying PATCO controllers creates a situation
whereby the PATCO controllers feel they will have no control.
The controllers may have confidence in their abilities, but
they cannot control the attitudes of persons doing the
training.

The potential for arbitrary disqualification in

this manner, after recommitting to the ATC profession by
giving up present occupations and moving families, weighs
heavily.

This, added to the inherent difficulty in attaining

a desirable proficiency level under normal circumstances
forms the basis for the controllers' concern
in re-qualifying.
The seventh concern the controllers have is, the same
conditions exist now as before the strike.

Twenty-two

(5.78%) of the respondents intimated they would be afraid
that the perceptions they held before the strike, indeed,
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went on strike for, remain unchanged.

Many controllers hold

hope that conditions have improved, partially accounting for
their desire to return.

Not fully knowing the present

conditions within the FAA does cause a degree of anxiety,
however, for controllers hoping to return to work.

Some who

struck because of conditions endured prior to 1981 will not
return.

These controllers feel whatever changes have taken

place since 1981 fall short of what is needed to improve
the system.
The eighth concern group is made up of former
controllers who desire to return to work but feel they will
no longer meet the requirements of the annual physical exam.
Failing eyesight, high blood pressure, and diabetes are a few
of the medical conditions mentioned that are capable of
causing a failure of the physical exam.

In compiling the

results for this question, it was somewhat surprising that
there were so few (20) respondents expressing the physical as
a concern.

Based on the numerous instances throughout the

study where physical problems were indicated as potential
hindrances, it was expected that this figure would be
appreciably higher.
The ninth group with a minimum 15 respondents sharing a
concern expresses an emotional fear most people can empathize
with.

The anxiety these 15 controllers have is in wondering

whether they will fit-in with their new co-workers.

Given

the turmoil the strike has created in many of the
controller's lives, it is understandable how profound the
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feelings of these men and women will be as they return to an
FAA facility for the first time after the passage of more
than 13 years.
Fitting in is assumed desirable and as such causes
anxious moments for any employee entering a new environment.
In the case of the PATCO controllers, the feeling associated
with fitting in will be heightened by questions of who the
co-workers are.
animosity?

If they are "scabs", will there be

If they were hired after the strike, will they be

upset if the returning PATCO controllers retain their
seniority?
controllers?

How will PATCO controllers be received by NATCA
These questions and others legitimize the PATCO

controller's concern about fitting in.
Again, the nine groups discussed in this question relate
the most frequently echoed concerns of the sample.

There

were numerous other concerns unique to individuals which did
not fit into the categories used.

Examples of quoted

controller concerns are included in Appendix I.

Chapter 4
Conclusion
This retrospective analysis of the PATCO controllers and
their strike offered a unique opportunity to examine the
feelings of a particularly intriguing group of people.

The

controllers, denied the legal right to strike because of
their federal employee status, engaged in an illegal strike
on August 3, 1981.

They did this knowing severe penalties

could be imposed, but believing what they were doing was
necessary-

History has proven the strike was ill-advised by

practical standards, but the majority of the sample maintains
now, as it did in 1981, that they were justified in their
actions.
Question 1 of the opinionnaire, when compared to
Question 2 regarding controller sentiment about the
justifiability of the strike, shows a 16.5% decrease in the
number of respondents.

Eighty-seven percent of the

controllers believed their actions were justified in 1981.
Those who now, in retrospect, remain convinced the strike was
a justifiable cause comprises 70.5% of the sample.

Comments

submitted by the respondents permeate the study, relating
feelings of loss, bitterness, and remorse due to being
removed from the careers they chose.

In spite of the 16.5%

moderation in their conviction and the losses they have
71

72
incurred, there is an acute sense of pride emanating from the
responses of this group of professionals.
By engaging the FAA in the 1981 strike, the PATCO
controllers brought upon themselves the unprecedented wrath
of their government.

Never before had a public sector union

been destroyed in its entirety by the government as PATCO
was.

The PATCO controllers held steadfastly to their

beliefs, which culminated in their terminations from the FAA.
As time passed, the increasing price paid in failed
marriages, broken families, and lost income has taken a toll
on how strongly the controllers believe in what they did
versus what was accomplished by it.

In retrospect the

controllers exhibit misgivings regarding the timing,
methodology, and economic advisability of going on strike
when they did.
Based on the data received from the opinionnaire, and
the accompanying comments supporting those data, the
hypothesis is accepted.

The hypothesis stated that the

majority of controllers would feel continued justification in
their actions of 1981, although these feelings of
justification would be mitigated by the fact the controllers
lost their jobs by their action.

Also, the perception of the

current state of the air traffic control system suggests many
of the key issues that led to the strike remain unresolved.
The rebuilding of the FAA's air traffic system has been
ongoing since the first day of the strike.

Initially, the

FAA used supervisory personnel and military controllers to
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supplement the controllers who did not participate in the
strike in an effort to keep the system from failing.

As the

months wore on and the military controllers returned to their
duty stations, the FAA began to replace them with newly hired
employees.

These employees were placed after completing

accelerated training programs at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma.
Controversial issues surrounding the rebuilding of the
system such as the alleged placing of previously disqualified
candidates and a congressional inquiry into improprieties at
the FAA Academy have surfaced during the years since the
strike.

Controller dissatisfaction continues to grow as the

system rebuilds.

This is evidenced by the formation of the

NATCA union and its recent moves to become more aggressive in
pressing the FAA to address a number of complaints.
complaint calls for an increase in staffing.

One such

NATCA and other

currently working controllers echo many of the same
complaints PATCO attempted to correct, but the FAA remains
slow to respond, adding to controller frustration.

"Despite

assurances of FAA officials and field supervisors that the
system is working well, most observers with whom we discussed
the issue spoke of an air traffic control system plagued by
low morale and growing internal tension."

(Nader & Smith,

1994, p. 130). NATCA, wary of PATCO's demise and bound by a
no-strike clause, appears similar to PATCO during its early
years.

NATCA is a voice for the controllers, but is limited

in its ability to effect change.
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Although some gains have been made since the strike, the
system lacks the tools, in terms of manpower and equipment,
to perform at optimum efficiency.

According to NATCA, "Too

often people were being certified because they needed the
controllers, not because they possessed the prerequisite
skills." (Nader & Smith, 1994, p. 133). PATCO controllers
have been a ready resource that, until President Clinton
lifted the ban, has been neglected as a solution.
Comparisons have been drawn over the past 13 years
between PATCO and other groups which acted against their
government in violation of the law.

One group is that of

draft dodgers who chose to move to Canada rather than
participate in the Vietnam war.

This group was accepted back

into the country with fewer restrictions and less persecution
than the PATCO controllers received.
Another comparison is one which appears as ironic as it
does contradictory.

Pictured on an Atlanta newspaper shortly

after the strike began was a striking PATCO member being led
to jail, manacled at the wrists, waist, and ankles.

His

crime was his participation in the air traffic controllers'
strike.

On the same front page, the newspaper carried an

article which featured President Reagan lauding the courage
of Polish labor leader Lech Walesa and his Solidarity union
for engaging in a strike against an oppressive Polish
government.

Both unions, PATCO and Solidarity, participated

in illegal strikes, but were seen in two completely different
ways by the administration of this country.
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The time has come, according to NATCA, President
Clinton, ALPA, and aviation safety advocates to allow those
PATCO controllers who wish to return to the ATC profession,
to do so.
"If this were simply a matter of humane consideration
for the thousands who lost their professions, it would
be worthwhile.

But rehiring the controllers would do

more than help individuals, it would promote the
national interest and improve the aviation safety
system."

(Nader & Smith, 1994, p. 139).

The opportunity exists to reinstall experience into the
system, experience lost with the dismissal of the PATCO
controllers.

This study provides information relevant to the

population of PATCO controllers and, as the sample indicates,
the consensus opinion of these controllers shows a
willingness on the part of many to return to their chosen
profession.

Chapter 5
Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to determine the consensus
opinion of controllers fired for their part in the PATCO
strike of 1981.

With that accomplished, and the majority of

these controllers indicating they would like to return to the
FAA, the recommendations of the researcher center around that
point.

Since it has been determined that most users of the

system now agree benefits can be realized by the return of
PATCO controllers, the conditions and processes required to
implement such a return must be worked out.

Negotiations in

this regard are currently being conducted by PATCO Lives,
other controller groups, and, as mentioned in the study, in
the court case on the issue of rehiring after the three year
penalty period.
This study presented a number of fears and concerns
PATCO controllers would have in returning to work.

It is

recommended that consideration be given to those concerns.
If the FAA's desire is to develop a cooperative working
relationship, the rehiring process will have to be
administered with integrity and equality-

Attention to the

installation of safeguards ensuring fairness in the return of
PATCO controllers to work is also deemed necessary.

The

fairness referred to is in regards to both the process of the
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selection of candidates and the integration of those
candidates into the system.

If a rehiring occurs in which

numerous controllers are permitted to return, it is
recommended that an independent committee be established for
the purpose of reviewing complaints of inequities in the
controller•s retraining/checkout.
Further study may be required to more precisely
determine the extent to which the sample's skills have
diminished.

If skill levels indicate an appreciable decline

in proficiency at a given level of traffic, or at a
particular age, then parameters prohibiting placement of
controllers in facilities while not properly skilled may be
needed.

The applications received by the FAA from PATCO

members can serve as a source for the FAA to conduct its own
poll to gain information specifically geared to those
actively pursuing a return to work.

This retrospective study

was intended to gauge the feelings of the sample controllers
regardless of whether they were resolved to return to work as
an air traffic control specialist or not.

By surveying only

those actively pursuing an air traffic position, a more
concise analysis will be available for use in establishing
the parameters for rehire.
The possibility of PATCO controllers regaining
employment with the FAA is dependent on the appropriation of
funds via budgetary approvals for increased staffing.
have been no PATCO controllers rehired since President
Clinton lifted the ban on their eligibility.

As hiring

There

constraints are relaxed, it would be reasonable to expect
PATCO controllers be hired as positions become available.
The experience represented by this group is plentiful as wel
as available and it would be advisable to tap this resource
to improve the ATC System.
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APPENDIX A
PART 2, QUESTION 1

Part 2, Question 1
When the strike began, did you feel it was a justifiable
cause?

I was working 58 hours a wk and maxing out, working and
not getting payed got old after a while.
Understaffed - Poor equipment - working 3 man positions
alone.
It was basically mob rule Peer Pressure, if one did not
participate, what fate would be yours?
Having worked in a center, I knew a lot of the stress.
I was 4 6 and running on nerves. But 50 was the
retirement age. The entire profession needs looking
at.
Force the govt to recognize the conditions of the
system.
FAA was trying to destroy Union.
save Union.

Strike was attempt to

Absolutely - 100%.
I didn't want to strike, voted against it, but followed
the union.
Right battle, wrong time to fight.
Not because of the money but because of the safety
issues.
There was no other choice that a loyal, Red blooded,
American, Dedicated to Right & Fair & the American Way,
could make.
85% can't be wrong.
Could have achieved more by staying in.
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15.

No question about it.

16.

The equipment was over worked and needed to be updated.

APPENDIX B
PART 2, QUESTION 2

Part 2, Question 2
n retrospect, do you now feel the strike was justified?

More than ever, my losses don't change the principle.
I participated only to help protect my fellow
controllers. I did so with guilt about breaking my
word.
In our facility, retirement was rare.
3.5 Billion dollars in ATC Delays in the FAA's effort
to still keep us out.
Justified, but unwise.
one.

A suicide mission if ever I saw

Even though I paid dearly.
FAA has not changed.
Yes but I wouldn't do it again.
Have you ever been unemployed?
We were set-up to be scape-goats, not worth losing our
jobs over.
No, only with reference to staggering financial losses
incurred by those fired.
Yes, but not worth the pain & suffering caused by same.
The cause was justified; the action was suicide for the
controllers, premeditated murder by the govt.
Damage done to families, fellow controllers, and the
system was too great for what was gained by the public
thus far.

We lost, and the country resents us and our strike, the
only people who benefitted were the scabs who replaced
us.
Not at the loss of all our careers.
Modernization program is now 15 years behind schedule.
The scabs got what we asked for.

APPENDIX C
PART 2, QUESTION 3

Part 2, Question 3
Do you feel the government had any viable alternative to
terminating you after the 48 hour return to work ultimatum
was issued?

What do they (Helms & Lewis) feel about destroying the
system so thoroughly?
Suspension, fine, etc. but not termination forever!!
The talent cost of controllers was not told to the
public.
It appears the govt didn't want a settlement.
Much too harsh - they forgave draft dodgers.
There was no 4 8 hr period to return. You have bought
the FAA lie, also. We at Sacramento, CA were locked
out & not allowed a return option.
They could have done the wise and compassionate thing;
i.e., bargained in good faith or found a mediator who
could. This would also have fulfilled their legal and
moral obligations to the flying public.
Once the ridiculous ultimatum was issued by Reagan
there was no backing down.
Would John Wayne have backed down?
There is/are/were many alternatives - however I would
have done the same if I was in their position.
Could have had "Cooling off" period with continued
negotiations.
Reagan and his cronies welcomed and encouraged the
strike. They wanted to make a statement with the
firings.
Negotiate and settle the issues.

APPENDIX D
PART 2, QUESTION 4

Part 2, Question 4
Do you feel the ATC system has recovered to an acceptable
level of safety and efficiency?

Safety record seems to be ok.
We found out we could be replaced.
I fly as a pilot on a regular basis in the midwest and
I have no fears of the system being unsafe.
I'd like to think otherwise but the facts wouldn't hold
up another opinion.
As an airline pilot for 6 years I personally
observed many deficiencies.
I haven't flown since 1981 and I won't. The ATC system
is unsafe because the FAA brought back people that had
previously washed out.
The system will never recover from the lost time, money
and manpower wasted during the strike.
Not according to friends on the inside.
I worked for the City of Laredo Tower for 9 mo.
system has not recovered.

The

Not based on what friends in the airline industry and
at the NTSB tell me. I don't fly as a result of things
they have told me.
I work in it and I can tell you for sure it hasn't.
As a commercial pilot, my confidence in the system is
very low and it is evident that expertise and
experience are lacking.
I see it every day - it's in terrible condition.
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14.

My husband flys for a regional airline.
way",

He says
"no
J

15.

I'm still in the business and well aware of the safety
problems.

16.

No! Definitely not.
need help BAD!!

I work with a center and they

APPENDIX E
PART 2, QUESTION 5

93

94

Part 2, Question 5
Do you feel the current ATC workforce has benefitted by your
sacrifice, in terms of overall working conditions?

1.

I hear the same complaints from current ATC's that we
had in 81'.

2.

My replacement makes $80,000 per yr - thanks to me.

3.

They have told me so.
come and thank me.

4.

Previous GS-13 (37k) now GS-14's @ 62.5k - say what?

5.

They're still burning them out as fast as before.

6.

As a GS-14-4 in 1981 Annual Salary $42,000.
GS-14-4 in 1992 Annual Salary $70,000+.

7.

They now get extra pay for time spent training other
people. Something PATCO fought for for years.

8.

My son now works in ATC and I see it in working
conditions, pay and benefits - but still poor
management.

9.

Yes, they have my job - making the income I should be.

10.

Flow control; increased separation.

11.

I believe they got more than we ever wanted.

12.

I know about 15 controllers (all hired since 81') in
several facilities, and my impression is nothing
(management's attitude) has changed.

13.

Very much so.

14.

I understand that management has become more receptive
to their needs and they get compensated generously for
doing what was taken for granted in the past.

One guy even had the balls to

As a

APPENDIX F
PART 2, QUESTION 6
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Part 2, Question 6
If the ban on rehiring was lifted, would you have reapplied
for your position?

1.

Whether I'm working or not, I'm an ATC.

2.

I am in another career and have no desire to work for
the FAA.

3.

I did reapply & was rejected.

4.

I was 1 year from retirement.
time to retire.

5.

I'm 58 years old and brain dead.
only for the sport of it.

6.

The strike will not be over for me until I walk into
the center and put on a headset again.

7.

Much better off with my health, much happier - would
never go back - that feels good!

8.

Would like to leave job on my own conditions.

9.

I am happy at what I now do but I loved my position
with the FAA.

10.

If only I knew what to expect.

11.

It was my chosen career.

12.

I would like to finish what I started.

13.

I'm hurtin' & have no career to support my family.

14.

I miss my profession...ATC is what I am.

15.

I loved my job.

16.

Always and forever.

Would like to get enough
I might reapply but

It was the bosses that sucked.
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17.

Why go back to what is worse now than when we left.

18.

I believe the demands of that job are too great on the
family.

19.

I am over 50 now and wouldn't. Could still do it but
it's not worth what it would cost me.

APPENDIX G
PART 2, QUESTION 7
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Part 2, Question 7
you feel animosity would be an issue if PATCO controllers
returned to the ATC system?

1.

I just want to get on with my life, and help rebuild
the system if I can.

2.

Time heals all wounds. If anyone, on either side,
still feels any animosity after 12 years, then I guess
I just feel sorry for them. The true professionals
will still be true professionals.

3.

Absolutely none.

4.

12 years is a long time to carry a grudge, isn't it?

5.

We're older and wiser.

6.

Its over.

7.

I work with FAA controllers.
feelings.

8.

Once accepted the new ATC's would realize we are not
the monsters they thought we were.

9.

I lost my job through my own actions - not the
replacement action.

10.

Most of the controllers I talk to would like us back.

11.

Controllers are a lot of things, but they are not
generally stupid.

12.

Be realistic! Some of these guys got in two years what
some of us worked 20 years for.

13.

The old FAA will never forget.

14.

I'm still angry about being fired.

They want us back, no bad

15.

100
No animosity among working controllers but I've talked
to some scab supervisors who are afraid of us coming
back to work.

16.

I'm not interested in violence, but will never trust a
"sprinter".

17.

There are a lot of bad feelings on both sides.
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Part 2, Question 8
If you were to return to the FAA, do you feel your ATC skills
would be adversely affected by twelve years away from the
position?

1.

I had a guest shot for 30 minutes.

I still have it.

2.

The aptitude for the job is the most important factor
for success.

3.

I'm 50, maybe FSS.

4.

Affected yes, adversely no.

5.

Controlling traffic is a diminishing skill.

6.

I am a controller.

7.

I would still be 1000 times better than someone off the
street.

8.

I'm pretty well rested now.

9.

I live by my old tower and watch the traffic, and the
current controllers don't move traffic as efficiently
as I do in my head.

10.

At age 60 I feel that I can still do the work.

11.

I'd be rusty, but could catch up rapidly.

12.

It's like riding a bike.

13.

I would be FPL in minimum time!!!

14.

Its a lot easier than it used to be.

15.

I was at my peak 12 years ago.
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Part 2, Question 9
What concerns would you have about returning to ATC?

Before it was a family, now it would be a job.
Finding my headset HA HA.
My bitterness toward the FAA, ALPA, and the currently
working strike breaking scum, will not allow me to work
in harmony with them.
Psychic survival in a hostile environment. Whether I'd
get a fair deal on checkout. Pretty much the same
concerns I had before. Being a woman in the FAA is not
an easy thing.
They can't deal with us, controllers, thinking for
ourselves, standing up for ourselves, we will never be
sheep.
Have a training instructor who has a hard on for PATCO
folks.
The FAA not using us to really rebuild the ATC system,
but to just continue to make negative examples of us...
I am not sure I would have the "love" for ATC I once
had.
The next strike.
Not being able to be the controller I was when I got
fired.
My concerns would be that all I have sacrificed was for
nothing.
The former scabs are now running the show.
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Dear fellow PATCO controller: Please take a moment now to
complete the following opinionnaire. The information will be
used in a confidential manner for a study accessing the
retrospective and current feelings of those controllers involved
in the strike of 1981. Your opinions are very important, so
please answer fully and honestly and return by mail within 14
days to: Steven Durnin-717 S. Beach St. #317C-Daytona BeachFiorida-32114. Thank you very much. The results of this study
will be made available to Bill Taylor at its completion.

PART 1
1.

(Please check appropriate space - explain if other)

How long were you employed by the Federal Aviation
Administration as an air traffic control specialist?
m

0-5 yrs
2.

15-20 yrs

other

lvl 2

lvl 3

lvl 4

lvl 5

other

What type of facility were you assigned to?
Tower

4.

10-15-yrs.

What level of facility were you assigned to at the time of the
strike?

lvl 1
3.

5-10 yrs

Tracon

Center

other

In which state was the facility located?
(fill in state name)

5.

What is your current occupation?
(fill in occupation)

Part 2
1.

(Please check appropriate space - fill in comment space)

When the strike begany did you feel it was a justifiable
cause?
YES
NO
(check one)

comment
2.

In retrospect, do you now feel the strike was justified?
YES
NO
(check one)

comment
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3.

Do you feel the government had any viable alternative to
terminating you after the 48 hour return to work
ultimatum was issued?
YES
NO
(check one)

comment
4.

Do you feel the ATC system has recovered to an acceptable
level of safety and efficiency?
YES
NO

comment

5.

Do you feel the current ATC workforce has benefitted by your
sacrifice, in terms of overall working conditions?
YES
NO
comment
6.

If the ban on rehiring was lifted, would you have reapplied for
your position? (answer YES or NO to each time frame)
1 mo. to 3 yrs

3 yrs to 7 yrs

7 yrs to 11 yrs
Would you reapply now?

YES

NO

comment

7.

Do you feel animosity would be an issue if PATCO controllers
returned to the ATC system?
YES
NO

comment
8.

If you were to return to the FAA, do you feel your ATC skills
would be adversely affected by twelve years away from the
position.
YES
NO

comment
9.

What concerns would you have about returning to ATC?

APPENDIX K
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Part 1, Question 5
tions Held By Former Controllers

Occupation
Management
Self Employed
ATC (Non-FAA)
Postal Service
Construction/Painting
Sales
Computers
Law Enforcement
Engineering
Truck Driver
Retired
Dispatcher
Pilot
Insurance
Unemployed
Accountant
Instructor
Technician
Banking
Airport Operations
Investor/Stock Broker
Custodian
Student
Immigration Service
Internal Revenue Service
Counselor
Machinist
Aeronautical Information Specialist
Department of Defense
Warehousing
Department of Agriculture
Customer Service
Electrician
Photographer
Plumber
Marketing
Military

2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Medical
Quality Control
Rail Traffic Control
Auditor
Clerk
Welder
Golf Pro
Federal Food Inspector
Exporter
Sign Maker
Film Design/Analysis Technician
Kitchen Design
Steel Fabricator
Federal Special Agent
Department of Labor Investigation
Longshoreman
Housewife/Mother
Jeweler
Tech Writer
Project Coordinator
Chemical Worker
Surveyor
Printer
Mechanic
Hearing Instrument Specialist
Department of Interior
Disability Determinations
Surfer
Real Estate Appraiser
Utility Company
Auto Builder
Paralegal
Satellite Controller
Firefighter
Ostrich Raiser

